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THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
WHY GOVERNMENT-BACKED FLOOD INSURANCE
IS DROWNING IN DEBT
I. AN INTRODUCTION

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM

TO THE

Joey’s Pizza & Pasta was a long-time popular restaurant located
on Long Beach Island, New Jersey.1 Aside from its food, the restaurant was well known for another thing — flooding.2 Flooding became so prevalent that the restaurant’s owner, Joe Rulli, added a
message to the sign outside that read “Occasional Waterfront Dining.”3 Rulli credits the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
for keeping him in business for nearly thirty years.4 Rulli filed several insurance claims over the years and worked tirelessly to mitigate the flood damage.5 The increasing occurrences of floods in
his location, however, led him to sell his property to Long Beach
Township.6 Rulli’s story, regrettably, is becoming increasingly more
common.7
This Comment provides an in-depth review of the NFIP.8 Part
II outlines the NFIP’s evolution and the effects of climate change
1. See Gilbert M. Gaul, How Rising Seas and Coastal Storms Drowned the U.S. Flood
Insurance Program, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 23, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/
how-rising-seas-and-coastal-storms-drowned-us-flood-insurance-program (discussing popular restaurant on Long Beach Island).
2. See id. (noting commonality of floods at restaurant).
3. See id. (describing restaurant sign).
4. See id. (attributing National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) for keeping
Rulli in business).
5. See id. (listing various measures taken to flood-proof Rulli’s restaurant).
6. See Gaul, supra note 1 (noting increased frequency of floods); see also Pat
Sharkey, Joey’s Pizza and Pasta in Beach Haven Crest Sold to Long Beach Township in
Effort to Combat Flooding, TAPINTOSTAFFORD/LBI (Apr. 21, 2019, 10:13 PM), https:/
/www.tapinto.net/towns/stafford-slash-lbi/sections/food-and-drink/articles/joeys-pizza-and-pasta-in-beach-haven-crest-sold-to-long-beach-township-in-effort-to-combat-flooding (discussing sale of Rulli’s restaurant).
7. See Brad Plumer, Rising Seas Could Menace Millions Beyond Shorelines, Study
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/30/climate/
sea-level-inland-floods.html (reporting increasing threat of flooding); see also Risky
Business: The Economic Risks of Climate Change in the United States, RISKY BUS. PROJECT
3 (June 2014) [hereinafter Risky Business], https://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/
uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf (observing potential
future losses due to flood damage).
8. For a further discussion of the NFIP as it exists today, see infra notes 87-162
and accompanying text.

(63)
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on the program.9 Part II also provides an overview of the insurance
market.10 Part III analyzes the NFIP’s current framework.11 Part IV
then examines issues plaguing the NFIP and explores possible solutions.12 Lastly, Part V discusses how implementing or ignoring such
solutions might impact the NFIP and market participants.13
II. A BRIEF HISTORY

OF THE

NFIP

In July 2020, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported that fifty-seven of sixty-two cities on the
East and Gulf Coasts set records for rising relative sea levels.14
NOAA forecasts that the rate of high-tide flooding may triple by
2030 and possibly increase by fifteen fold by 2050.15 This dramatic
increase in flooding does not come without its costs.16 As of January 5, 2021, the NFIP is over twenty billion dollars in debt.17 This
debt is primarily due to an increase in the frequency of powerful
tropical storms, rising sea levels, and faulty policies and programs.18
9. For a further discussion of climate change and its effect on the NFIP, see
infra notes 14-71 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the flood insurance market, see infra notes 7286 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the NFIP’s current framework, see infra notes
87-162 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of problems the NFIP faces and potential solutions, see infra notes 163-200 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the importance of the NFIP moving forward,
see infra notes 201-13 and accompanying text.
14. William Sweet et al., 2019 State of U.S. High Tide Flooding with a 2020 Outlook, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. 4 (July 2020), https://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/publications/Techrpt_092_2019_State_of_US_High_Tide_Flood
ing_with_a_2020_Outlook_30June2020.pdf (documenting prevalence of coastal
flooding); see also Christopher Flavelle, New Data Shows an “Extraordinary” Rise in
U.S. Coastal Flooding, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
07/14/climate/coastal-flooding-noaa.html (observing dramatic increase in U.S.
coastal and high-tide flooding).
15. See Flavelle, supra note 14 (reporting projected increase in high-tide flooding). NOAA defines high-tide flooding as water rising at least twenty-one inches
above the average high-tide level. See U.S. High-Tide Flooding Continues to Increase,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (July 14, 2020), https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/us-high-tide-flooding-continues-to-increase (defining high-tide
flooding).
16. See Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/a-brokeand-broken-flood-insurance-program.html (describing costs of NFIP).
17. See DIANE P. HORN & BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44593, INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) 26 (Dec. 9, 2021)
[hereinafter INTRODUCTION], https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R44593.pdf (calculating current NFIP debt).
18. See Walsh, supra note 16 (discussing debt problems of NFIP).
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The NFIP’s indebtedness is due to a combination of natural
disasters and a lack of private flood insurers.19 For example, the
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 caused nearly all private insurers to
leave the flood insurance market, requiring the government to fill
the void through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
(NFIA).20 As natural disaster after natural disaster mounted over
the past two decades, the NFIP has remained the sole insurer in a
seemingly never-ending debt crisis.21
A. The Beginnings of the NFIP
To better understand the NFIP’s dire situation, it is best to start
from its inception.22 In April 1927, heavy rains caused the Mississippi River to overflow at unprecedented levels.23 The levee system
built along the river systematically collapsed over a few weeks, causing flooding in surrounding residential areas to reach up to thirty
feet of water.24 This event, known as the Great Mississippi Flood of
1927, is “one of the worst natural disasters in the history of the
United States.”25 The flood caused more than twenty-three thousand square miles of flooding and displaced an estimated 750 thousand people from their homes.26 As a result, most private insurance
companies stopped providing flood-loss coverage, deeming it too
risky.27 Between 1929 and 1968, the United States flood insurance
market was practically non-existent.28 Instead, Congress passed sev19. See Logan Strother, The National Flood Insurance Program: A Case Study in
Policy Failure, Reform, and Retrenchment, 46 POL’Y STUD. J. 452, 459-60 (2018) (examining insurance market, NFIP policies, and natural disasters as contributing factors
to NFIP debt).
20. Id. (stating private insurers left market after 1927); see also Walsh, supra
note 16 (determining Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 caused private insurers to
drop flood insurance coverage).
21. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 27 (noting impossibility of NFIP, in its
current form, to pay off its debt fully in ten years).
22. See Strother, supra note 19, at 452 (discussing historical failure of NFIP).
23. See Mississippi River Flood of 1927, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/event/Mississippi-River-flood-of-1927 (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) (noting
cause of Mississippi River flood).
24. Id. (describing levee system’s collapse).
25. Id. (contextualizing natural disaster).
26. Id. (detailing extent of flood damage).
27. See Strother, supra note 19, at 459 (explaining why private insurers abandoned flood-insurance market).
28. See A Chronology of Major Events Affecting the National Flood Insurance Program, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY 2-13 (Oct. 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_mip_apnd_h.pdf (observing void in United
States flood insurance coverage).
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eral bills and took other measures to help pay for flood disaster
relief when necessary.29
In September of 1965, Hurricane Betsy made landfall in the
southeastern region of the United States.30 It tore through parts of
Florida and Louisiana, causing over one billion dollars in damage.31
Aside from the financial loss, Hurricane Betsy claimed the lives of
seventy-six people.32 The damage left in Hurricane Betsy’s wake
spurred calls for the government to fix this “market failure” and
create a flood insurance program.33 In response, Congress passed
the NFIA, which created the NFIP.34
Congress cited “an increasing burden on the Nation’s resources” resulting from flood disasters as the primary motivation to
create the NFIP.35 The legislation’s purpose centered around two
main policy objectives.36 Congress’s first goal focused on providing
expansive access to flood insurance.37 This helps minimize the financial risk of property owners in flood-prone areas.38 Moreover,
by charging insurance premiums in exchange for coverage, the government shifts the economic burden of paying for disaster relief to
the property owners who are most likely to experience flood-related
disasters and require federal aid.39 Congress’s second goal aimed
at reducing the country’s overall flood risk.40 This goal is achieved
by conditioning the availability of flood insurance to a community’s
29. See id. (listing actions Congress took in aftermath of Great Mississippi
Flood of 1927). Congress enacted bills that, among other things, provided direct
payments, loans, and investment for flood-prone areas. See id. (detailing effects of
congressional legislation).
30. Kelby Ouchley, Hurricane Betsy, 64 PARS., https://64parishes.org/entry/
hurricane-betsy (Feb. 9, 2021) (noting date of landfall).
31. Id. (quantifying damage caused by Hurricane Betsy).
32. Id. (stating Hurricane Betsy’s casualties).
33. Strother, supra note 19, at 459 (analyzing history of NFIP); see also Bethan
Moorcraft, The National Flood Insurance Program — Everything You Need to Know, INS.
BUS. (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/guides/the-national-flood-insurance-program—everything-you-need-to-know-162323.aspx (discussing Hurricane Betsy’s impact on NFIP creation).
34. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-129 (outlining NFIP).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (delineating need of widely available flood
insurance).
36. Id. (listing reasons for enacting NFIP).
37. Id. (codifying overarching goal of NFIP).
38. See Flood Insurance, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://
www.fema.gov/flood-insurance (May 26, 2021) (observing advantages of flood
insurance).
39. See Walsh, supra note 16 (noting benefits of government-backed insurance
program over disaster relief bailouts).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (explaining purpose of NFIP).
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adoption of floodplain management standards.41 The standards’
purpose was to curb development in flood-prone areas while also
mitigating the effects of flood damage and otherwise improving
land management in flood-prone areas.42
Before 2005, the NFIP was generally solvent.43 The 2005 hurricane season, however, required the program to pay over sixteen billion dollars in claims.44 Disaster struck again during the 2017
hurricane season when Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria made
landfall in the United States.45 Hurricane Harvey, specifically,
caused massive flood damage in the greater Houston area.46 Despite Congress cancelling sixteen billion dollars of debt in October
of 2017, the NFIP borrowed twelve billion dollars to cover insurance obligations stemming from the 2017 hurricane season.47 The
NFIP’s debt will seemingly continue to accumulate due to the increase in sea levels across the globe and the frequency and strength
of tropical cyclones.48
B. The Effect of Climate Change on the NFIP
Hurricanes and tropical storms that made landfall in the
United States over the past two decades are responsible for an overwhelming percentage of the NFIP’s current debt.49 This issue is
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (listing conditions of flood insurance availability).
42. See id. (delineating minimum standards required to provide NFIP
insurance).
43. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17 (reviewing NFIP’s finances).
44. See Walsh, supra note 16 (calculating cost of 2005 hurricane season). Hurricane Katrina alone caused roughly 161 billion dollars of damage. See Kathryn
Reid, 2005 Hurricane Katrina: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help, WORLD VISION, https://
www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/2005-hurricane-katrinafacts#damage (Nov. 25, 2019) (aggregating Hurricane Katrina’s damage across
Gulf Coast).
45. 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Fast Facts, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/
2017/05/15/us/2017-atlantic-hurricane-season-fast-facts/index.html (June 2,
2020) (listing storms that formed during 2017 hurricane season).
46. See Walsh, supra note 16 (noting Hurricane Harvey’s impact on Houston);
see also Heather Long, Where Harvey is Hitting Hardest, 80 Percent Lack Flood Insurance,
WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2017/08/29/where-harvey-is-hitting-hardest-four-out-of-five-homeowners-lackflood-insurance/ (discussing fallout of Hurricane Harvey).
47. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17 (examining NFIP financing activities
during 2017 hurricane season).
48. See Global Warming and Hurricanes, GEOPHYSICAL FLUID DYNAMICS LAB’Y
[hereinafter Global Warming], https://www.gfdl.noaa.gov/global-warming-and-hurricanes/ (Sept. 23, 2020) (analyzing impact of global warming on frequency of
hurricanes and tropical storms).
49. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17 (acknowledging NFIP’s debt problems
began shortly after Hurricane Katrina in 2005).
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likely to worsen in the coming years, as scientists project that tropical cyclone strength and rainfall rates will increase.50
Hurricanes are one of the most destructive forces on earth.51
A hurricane requires two things to form: (1) a weather disturbance
and (2) warm seawater.52 Research has shown a statistically significant trend that hurricanes today are more likely to strengthen into
category three storms or higher when compared to hurricanes in
the 1970s.53 These findings support the scientific consensus that
rising sea temperatures affect the frequency of powerful
hurricanes.54
Studies have also shown a correlation between an increase in
greenhouse gas emissions and rising sea surface temperatures.55
An increase in greenhouse gas emissions traps heat in the Earth’s
atmosphere and transfers it back to the ocean.56 As a result, over
the past three decades, average sea surface temperatures have been
higher than at any other point since 1880.57 Greenhouse gas emis-

50. See Global Warming, supra note 48 (finding tropical cyclone strength and
rainfall rates likely to increase in future).
51. See Steve Graham & Holli Riebeek, Hurricanes: The Greatest Storms on Earth,
NAT’L AERONAUTICS SPACE ADMIN. (Nov. 1, 2006), https://earthobservatory.nasa.
gov/features/Hurricanes (discussing hurricane strength). Indeed, “a hurricane
can expend as much energy as 10,000 nuclear bombs[.]” Id. (quantifying destructive power of hurricanes).
52. How Does the Ocean Affect Hurricanes?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/facts/hurricanes.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2021) (describing formation of hurricanes).
53. Henry Fountain, Climate Change is Making Hurricanes Stronger, Researchers
Find, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/climate/climate-changes
-hurricane-intensity.html (Oct. 7, 2020) (analyzing data of strengthening storms);
see also Katharina Buchholz, Unpredictable Danger: Hurricane Seasons Since 1967,
STATISTA (May 21, 2021), https://www.statista.com/chart/11009/hurricanes-overthe-atlantic-basin/ (finding stronger storms are more frequent today than fifty
years ago). A category three hurricane is a hurricane with winds between 111 and
129 miles per hour. Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshws.php (last visited Jan. 23,
2021) (categorizing hurricanes by sustained wind speed).
54. See Global Warming, supra note 48 (finding statistical relationship between
rising sea surface temperature and hurricane strength).
55. See id. (linking greenhouse gas emissions to increase in sea surface
temperatures).
56. LuAnn Dahlman & Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Ocean Heat Content,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.climate.gov/
news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-ocean-heat-content
(describing process of warming oceans across globe).
57. Climate Change Indicators: Sea Surface Temperature, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY
(July 18, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-sea-surface-temperature (noting increase in global sea surface temperature).
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sions continue to rise, leading to warmer oceans and the likelihood
of more powerful hurricanes.58
Global warming and the increase in sea surface temperatures
further impact the NFIP’s solvency issues by causing sea levels to
rise across the globe.59 As sea surface temperatures increase, glaciers and ice sheets worldwide melt.60 Ten percent of the earth’s
land is glacial ice, yet this percentage accounts for roughly sixtynine percent of the world’s freshwater.61 If all glacial ice melted,
the world’s sea level would rise about 230 feet.62 Indeed, between
2006 and 2015, sea levels rose by 0.14 inches per year, which was
more than double the average rate throughout the twentieth
century.63
Additionally, the volume of the ocean expands as sea level temperatures increase.64 This phenomenon is known as thermal expansion.65 Scientists have determined that thermal expansion
accounts for about one-third of the increase in global sea levels.66
The recent trend in sea level rise shows no signs of stopping.67
A 2017 study concluded that the most conservative greenhouse gas
emission projections would cause sea levels to rise by at least twelve
58. See Rebecca Hersher, Greenhouse Gas Emissions are Still Rising, U.N. Report
Says, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 26, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/
26/782586224/greenhouse-gas-emissions-are-still-rising-u-n-report-says (reporting
continued increase in greenhouse gas emissions); see also Global Warming, supra
note 48 (linking warming oceans with frequency of stronger hurricanes).
59. See Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Global Sea Level, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-sea-level (analyzing rise in global sea
levels).
60. Id. (discussing increased rate of glacier and ice sheet melting).
61. All About Glaciers, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR., https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/glaciers/quickfacts.html (Mar. 16, 2020) (observing quantity of fresh water
stored in glaciers).
62. Id. (quantifying future rise in sea level).
63. Lindsey, supra note 59 (examining rate of sea level increase).
64. Id. (analyzing cause of rapid sea level rise).
65. See Understanding Sea Level, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://
sealevel.nasa.gov/understanding-sea-level/global-sea-level/thermal-expansion (last
visited Feb. 8, 2021) (identifying cause of rising sea levels). Thermal expansion is
the “fractional change in size of a material in response to a change in temperature.” Glenn Elert, Thermal Expansion, PHYSICS HYPERTEXTBOOK, https://physics.info/expansion/summary.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2021) (defining thermal
expansion).
66. Understanding Sea Level, supra note 65 (determining increase in sea level
attributable to thermal expansion); see also Lindsey, supra note 59 (outlining factors contributing to rise in global sea levels).
67. See Lindsey, supra note 59 (discussing future projections of rising sea
levels).
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inches above 2000 levels by 2100.68 Conversely, with high levels of
greenhouse gas emissions, sea levels could rise to over eight feet
above 2000 levels by 2100.69 Other studies have determined that if
melting glaciers and sea surface temperatures continue on their
current trajectory, between sixty-six and 106 billion dollars of
coastal real estate will be underwater by 2050.70 Rising sea levels
increase coastal flooding risk, which increases the amount of potential claims the NFIP must pay out.71
C. An Overview of the Flood Insurance Market
Purchasing insurance is a form of risk management to protect
oneself from unforeseen loss.72 Insurance companies stake their
profitability on identifying, pooling, and redistributing risk across
their customers.73 Generally, insurance companies make money in
two ways: insurance premiums and the investments made using
those premiums.74 Although insurance revenue models differ
across various sectors, the most important function of any insurance
company is to adequately price risk and the premiums it charges for
assuming that risk.75 To generate income, insurance companies
must price coverage to entice lower-risk customers to purchase insurance, which helps pay for claims from higher-risk customers.76
Flood insurance, however, presents the antithesis of a healthy
insurance market.77 Customers face a high risk of flooding when
68. Id. (observing best case scenario for rising sea levels).
69. Id. (noting worst case scenario for rising sea levels).
70. See Risky Business, supra note 7, at 4 (analyzing impact of rising sea level).
71. See Agustin Indaco, Francesc Ortega & Suleyman Taspinar, Flood Insurance
in a World with Rising Seas, ECONOFACT (Oct. 15, 2018), https://econofact.org/
flood-insurance-in-a-world-with-rising-seas (observing NFIP’s increasing economic
burden).
72. See Julia Kagan, Insurance, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/i/insurance.asp (Mar. 30, 2021) (identifying purpose of insurance
protection).
73. Sean Ross, What Is the Main Business Model for Insurance Companies?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/052015/what-main-business
-model-insurance-companies.asp (June 25, 2019) (discussing insurance companies’
business model).
74. Id. (identifying insurance companies’ main revenue streams). Premiums
are “the consideration paid for a contract of insurance.” Premium, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/premium (last visited Jan. 22,
2021) (defining premiums).
75. See Ross, supra note 73 (establishing insurance companies’ most important
tasks).
76. See id. (explaining insurance company business model).
77. See Logan Strother, National Flood Insurance Will Help Clean Up After Irma
and Harvey. And That’s a Problem., WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2017, 1:06 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/11/national-flood-in
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purchasing coastal properties or homes built on floodplains.78 As a
result, fewer lower-risk customers are willing to buy insurance coverage, potentially exposing private insurance companies to extensive
losses.79 This void in demand is one of the primary reasons why
Congress stepped in to create the NFIP, which provides affordable
flood insurance coverage to property owners who would otherwise
have no other recourse.80
Despite flaws with flood insurance, “[F]ederal policies, new
technology[,]” and large increases in funding have prompted private insurers to recently re-enter the market.81 In 2019, Congress
authorized regulated lending institutions to accept certain private
flood insurance policies in lieu of an NFIP plan.82 Congress’s new
regulation permitted property owners to choose a private insurance
plan if their property was in an area where the NFIP mandates
flood insurance coverage.83 Furthermore, new surveying technology and flood risk models improved private insurers’ ability to predict floods, enabling them to better assess risk.84 Institutional
investors provided large amounts of capital, which further facilitated the return of private insurers to the flood insurance market.85
These factors have allowed private insurance to grow to roughly five

surance-will-help-clean-up-after-irma-and-harvey-and-thats-a-problem/ (describing
difficulties faced by private insurers in flood insurance market).
78. See id. (discussing geographic flood risk).
79. See id. (highlighting speculative nature of offering flood insurance).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (classifying consumer protection as one reason for
enacting NFIP).
81. Thomas Frank, The Private Sector is Returning to the Flood Insurance Game,
SCI. AM. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-privatesector-is-returning-to-the-flood-insurance-game/ (observing reasons for private sector’s return to flood insurance market).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(1)(B) (authorizing applicable private flood insurance policies in lieu of NFIP coverage). For a private insurance plan to qualify, the
plan must at least cover “the outstanding principal of the loan or the maximum
limit of coverage” under the NFIP, whichever is less. Id. § 4012a(b)(1)(A) (identifying requirements of applicable private flood insurance plans). For a further discussion of when the NFIP mandates that property owners purchase flood
insurance, see infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
83. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 9-10 (observing increase in consumer
choice); see also Frank, supra note 81 (examining privatization of flood insurance).
84. See Pat Howard, Private Flood Insurance vs NFIP, POLICYGENIUS (July 16,
2019), https://www.policygenius.com/homeowners-insurance/private-flood-insurance-vs-nfip/ (assessing technological advancements in flood insurance market);
see also Frank, supra note 81 (noting progress of risk-modeling companies).
85. See Frank, supra note 81 (analyzing role of increased investment in private
insurance companies).
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percent of the flood insurance market, with continued growth
likely.86
III. THE NFIP IN ACTION: THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
FLOOD INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES

OF

PUBLIC

Congress authorized the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to regulate and administer the NFIP.87 As of September 30, 2020, the NFIP owed over twenty billion dollars to the
United States Treasury.88 The NFIP has over five million active policies, representing roughly $1.3 trillion in flood insurance coverage.89 The average annual premium charged is $730, which
translates to revenues of roughly $3.4 billion per year.90
A. Availability of NFIP Coverage
To purchase flood insurance under the NFIP, the property
must be located in a participating community’s jurisdiction.91 A
community is “a [s]tate or political subdivision” with jurisdiction
over zoning and building codes in particular areas.92 Congress
does not require communities to participate in the NFIP.93 A community participating in the NFIP, however, must adhere to a set of
minimum standards.94 The NFIP intended these legally imposed
standards to reduce new land development, mitigate flood damage,
and improve current land management in flood-prone areas.95
These objectives are consistent with the NFIP’s goal of reducing the
overall risk that flood damage poses to property owners.96
86. Id. (evaluating growth of private insurance); see also Howard, supra note 84
(discussing growth of private insurance in flood insurance market).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a) (noting FEMA’s authority to regulate NFIP).
88. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, THE WATERMARK — NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (2020) [hereinafter THE WATERMARK],
https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_nfip_eval_chronology.
pdf (recording debt owed to United States Treasury).
89. See id. (highlighting extent of NFIP coverage).
90. See id. (analyzing NFIP financial statements).
91. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 8 (delineating requirements to
purchase national flood insurance).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(1) (defining communities).
93. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 2 (observing choice that communities
have).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (requiring communities to follow standards to participate in NFIP).
95. Id. (listing minimum standards).
96. See id. § 4001(a) (identifying preventative and protective measures as goal
of NFIP).
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State and local governments enforce minimum floodplain
management standards.97 The standards often translate into regulations, such as requiring development permits for flood-prone areas, mandating buildings in flood-prone areas to raise their lowest
floor to safe levels, and necessitating specific construction materials
and methods to mitigate flood risk.98 Communities should consider these standards as a baseline because they may adopt more
stringent measures to reduce flood risk.99
Despite communities having discretion to participate in the
NFIP, Congress requires certain property owners to purchase NFIP
flood insurance.100 Under the NFIP, any property owner who is located in a special flood hazard area (SFHA) and seeks to acquire,
increase, extend, or renew a mortgage backed by a federally regulated lending institution must purchase flood insurance as a precondition to the loan.101 A SFHA is subject to a one percent or
greater risk of flooding every year.102 The purpose of the
mandatory mortgage purchase requirement is to “increase compliance with flood insurance requirements and participation in the
NFIP.”103 Moreover, the requirement helps alleviate the financial
burden on the government by ensuring property owners, who assume the risk of flood damage, pay their share of insurance coverage.104 In 2012, Congress amended the mandatory mortgage
purchase requirement to allow qualifying private flood insurance to
satisfy the statutory requirement.105 Although this amendment un97. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 6-7 (noting communities’ role in enforcing NFIP minimum standards).
98. Id. (providing examples of regulation meeting NFIP minimum floodplain
management standards).
99. See id. at 7 (acknowledging communities’ right to impose stricter preventative measures).
100. Id. at 9 (determining when property owners are required to purchase
flood insurance).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a) (delineating mandatory mortgage purchase
requirement); see also Lending – Flood Disaster Protection, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 6.1,
6.2 (Sept. 2019) [hereinafter Lending], https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compli
ance/manual/5/V-6.1.pdf (outlining mandatory mortgage purchase
requirement).
102. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 3 (defining SFHA). A SFHA is also
known as a “base flood or 100-year floodplain.” Flood Zones, FED. EMERGENCY
MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/glossary/flood-zones (July 8, 2020) (explaining SFHAs).
103. Lending, supra note 101, at 6.1 (discussing rationale of requiring property
owners to purchase flood insurance).
104. See id. (analyzing benefits of mandatory mortgage purchase
requirement).
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(1)(B) (codifying property owners’ ability to
meet statutory requirement with private flood insurance); see also Lending, supra

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

11

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 3

74

VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 33

dercuts the goal of increasing consumer participation in the NFIP,
it provides consumers with the ability to shop for a flood insurance
policy that is more suited to their needs.106
B. Reducing Flood Risk
An overarching policy goal of the NFIP is to lower the overall
risk that flood damage will occur.107 One way the NFIP attempts to
achieve this goal is by conditioning participation in the program on
the adoption of minimum standards of floodplain management.108
Another way the NFIP attempts to accomplish this goal is by developing Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) and enacting flood-prevention policies based on those maps.109 FIRMs are “official
community maps” that identify SFHAs, assess flood risk, and establish risk premium zones.110 As such, FIRMs represent an important
resource for both FEMA and property owners.111
The NFIP charges FEMA with “identify[ing] and publish[ing]
information” related to flood-risk locations in the United States.112
The NFIP requires FEMA to update its flood risk information and
estimate the potential flood-related loss in identified at-risk
zones.113 FEMA fulfills this duty by publishing FIRMs.114 FEMA
uses the data collected in FIRMS to assess flood risk and price premiums, as well as to determine which property owners must
purchase NFIP flood insurance.115 Property owners utilize FIRMs
note 101, at 6.1 (discussing availability of certain private flood insurance policies to
satisfy statutory requirements).
106. See Howard, supra note 84 (explaining benefits tied to variety of floodinsurance policies available for consumers).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (outlining purpose of NFIP). For a further discussion of the purpose of the NFIP, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012(c) (requiring adoption of minimum floodplain
management standards as precondition to NFIP flood insurance availability).
109. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 3 (highlighting NFIP measures to
accomplish policy goals).
110. See id. (identifying function of FIRMs); see also Flood Map Products, FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/flood-maps/products-tools/
products (Nov. 16, 2020) (discussing FIRMs and other FEMA reports).
111. See Howard Kunreuther & Marilyn Montgomery, The Importance of Accurate Flood Hazard Maps and Risk-Based Premiums, WHARTON UNIV. OF PA. (Mar. 28,
2018), https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/lab-notes/importance-accurateflood-hazard-maps-risk-based-premiums/ (discussing critical role of accurate
FIRMs).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a)(1) (highlighting specific responsibilities to minimize flood risk).
113. Id. § 4101(a)(2) (providing additional responsibilities for FEMA).
114. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 3 (explaining purpose of FIRMs).
115. See id. (observing FEMA’s use of FIRMs).
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to inform property purchasing decisions and evaluate their own
level of flood risk.116
The NFIP requires FEMA to assess the need to update FIRMs at
least once every five years.117 Furthermore, FEMA updates its
FIRMs if it deems an update necessary after review or upon request
from a participating community.118 A participating community
must have sufficient supporting data and the necessary funding for
FEMA to update its FIRMs upon request.119 Therefore, while the
NFIP instructs FEMA to assess the need to update its flood maps, it
is not obligated to unless a state or local government makes a valid
request.120
As a result, FIRMs across the country “vary considerably in age
and in quality.”121 FEMA tracks the need to update its maps with its
Coordinated Needs Management Strategy.122 This process analyzes
the flood hazard lifecycle and prioritizes which FIRMs need updating.123 FIRMs may become out of date when changes to the “topography, hydrology, [or] land development” occur in any given
area.124 Congress established the Technical Mapping Advisory
Council (Council) to advise FEMA on how to best produce
FIRMs.125 The Council estimates that FEMA takes an average of
three to five years to create new FIRMs, which is much higher than
the Council’s recommended timeline of twenty-five months.126
State and local governments use the most up-to-date FIRMs
available to enact policies that meet the NFIP’s minimum floodplain management standards.127 Communities enforce the policies
116. See id. (noting consumer benefits of using FIRMS).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(e) (outlining FEMA deadlines to review FIRMs).
118. See id. § 4101(f) (delineating when FEMA must update FIRMs).
119. Id. (listing requirements necessary for participating community to obligate FEMA to update FIRMs).
120. Id. (noting while duty to update maps is usually discretionary, it is obligatory upon state or local government request).
121. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 4 (explaining qualitative difference in
FIRMs across country).
122. Coordinated Needs Management Strategy, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/flood-maps/tools-resources/risk-map/coordinated-needsmanagement-strategy (May 14, 2021) (detailing FEMA’s Coordinated Needs Management Strategy).
123. Id. (discussing methodology of updating FIRMs).
124. Id. (enumerating different causes that affect FIRM validity).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 4101a(a), (c) (establishing Council and listing Council’s
duties).
126. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 5-6 (discussing disparity between Council’s recommendations and FEMA’s practices).
127. See id. at 6-7 (analyzing how communities develop floodplain management policies).
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themselves, as opposed to FEMA or another federal agency.128
FEMA does, however, monitor compliance by conducting community assistance visits to compile data on enforcement.129 To help
incentivize floodplain management, FEMA offers state and local
governments monetary awards through its Flood Mitigation Assistance Grant Program.130 Participating communities become eligible to receive benefits under the program by undertaking projects
that “reduce or eliminate the risk of repetitive flood damage to
buildings insured by the [NFIP].”131 Examples of these projects include floodproofing buildings, acquiring repetitive loss properties,
and elevating flood-prone land.132
C. Public Flood Insurance Policies
FEMA has broad discretion in creating flood insurance policies.133 Congress granted FEMA the authority to select the types of
properties that are eligible for flood insurance, as well as to determine what the policy covers, limitations on coverage, and the price
of premiums and deductibles.134 FEMA created three different
types of standard insurance policies: “[T]he Dwelling, the General
Property, and the Residential Condominium Building Association”
policies.135 These policies contain two different types of coverage
— building coverage and contents coverage.136 Building coverage
includes damage to the building structure itself, while contents coverage protects various personal belongings and other items damaged within a building.137 Individuals may purchase contents
coverage separately from building coverage.138 Certain costs of
flood damage are not included in any type of flood insurance cover128. Id. at 7 (discussing community floodplain management enforcement).
129. Id. (evaluating FEMA oversight over enforcement standards).
130. See id. at 8 (outlining purpose of FEMA grant program).
131. Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Grant, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/floods (May 20, 2021) (discussing grant
program).
132. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 8 (listing examples of qualifying
projects).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 4013(a) (identifying FEMA’s authority to determine
bounds of flood insurance coverage).
134. See id. (listing extent of FEMA’s authority).
135. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 8 (identifying three standardized flood
insurance policies).
136. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM:
SUMMARY OF COVERAGE 4 (2021), https://agents.floodsmart.gov/sites/default/
files/fema_NFIP-summary-of-coverage_brochure_09-2021.pdf (outlining boundaries of coverage).
137. Id. (listing what is covered by building and contents coverage).
138. Id. (examining bounds of content coverage).
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age, such as living expenses from temporary housing, “financial
losses caused by business interruption,” and damages to property
outside of a building.139
Preferred Risk Policies are also available for properties that are
not located within a SFHA.140 These policies use the same forms
and offer the same coverage as the Standard Flood Insurance Policies but are offered at a lower price to reflect the lower risk.141
FEMA encourages property owners to purchase Preferred Risk Policies to help protect the financial interests of uncovered property
owners who suffer flood damage and increase the policy base to
help secure the NFIP’s financial soundness.142
The amount of coverage each policy provides depends on the
type of coverage and the amount of people living in the covered
building.143 Under a Dwelling Form policy, which applies to a residential property of one to four people, the maximum building coverage available is $250,000 and the maximum contents coverage is
one hundred thousand dollars.144 Although the NFIP caps the
amount at $250,000, policy owners can purchase additional flood
coverage through private insurers.145
The NFIP authorized FEMA to price insurance premiums
based on “the risk involved and accepted actuarial principles.”146
This involves calculating the flood risk and quoting a price based
on that risk.147 FEMA evaluates a structure’s risk by examining its
flood zone in the FIRM, assessing the elevation of the structure, and
a combination of other factors.148 Pricing of premiums, however, is
also affected by various subsidies FEMA offers to policy holders.149
139. Id. at 3 (identifying exclusions from all forms of flood insurance
coverage).
140. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 12 (discussing nature of Preferred
Risk Policies).
141. Id. (comparing Preferred Risk Policies to Standard Flood Insurance
Policies).
142. Id. (explaining FEMA’s purpose in offering Preferred Risk Policies).
143. Id. at 9 (examining maximum coverage under all policies).
144. National Flood Insurance Program Summary of Coverage, FEMA 1, https://
www.nh.gov/insurance/consumers/documents/summary_cov.pdf (last visited
Feb. 14, 2020) (detailing maximum coverage amounts).
145. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 9 (noting alternatives for purchasing
additional flood insurance coverage).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(1)(A)(i) (delineating FEMA pricing method for insurance premiums).
147. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 15 (explaining FEMA pricing
methodology).
148. Id. at 15-16 (examining how FEMA evaluates risk).
149. See id. (noting effect subsidies have on actuarial pricing principles).
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The NFIP authorizes FEMA to discount premium pricing to
“encourage prospective insureds to purchase flood insurance.”150
Flood insurance subsidies effectively lower the price of insurance
for property owners and shift away from actuarial pricing.151 Currently, three different types of NFIP subsidies exist for different categories of property: “[P]re-FIRM properties, newly mapped
properties, and grandfathered properties.”152
The Pre-FIRM subsidy applies to properties built before 1975
or before FEMA published the first FIRM for the community where
the property lies, whichever is later.153 The policy’s purpose is to
prevent pre-existing properties from being penalized but enable
them to contribute to the financial burden of flood insurance.154
“As of March 2017, approximately 16.1% of all NFIP policies received a pre-FIRM subsidy.”155
The newly mapped subsidy applies to properties recently
mapped into a SFHA by an updated flood map.156 This subsidy
helps property owners pay their new premiums by initially offering
a subsidized rate that increases over time.157 After the first year, the
newly mapped subsidy rate begins to increase annually at a rate of
no greater than eighteen percent until it matches a full-risk rate.158
Currently, only four percent of properties receive this type of
subsidy.159
Grandfathered rates apply when a property that is already located in a SFHA and adheres to all NFIP regulations is remapped
into a new flood rate class.160 Despite the higher actuarial rate of
the policy, this subsidy allows the property owner to pay premiums
150. 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(2) (identifying actuarial pricing principle
exception).
151. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 16 (discussing relationship between
subsidies and actuarial risk).
152. DIANE P. HORN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45091, 21ST CENTURY FLOOD REFORM ACT (H.R. 2874): REFORMING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 4
(Jan. 23, 2018) [hereinafter REFORMING THE NFIP], https://sgp.fas.org/crs/
homesec/R45019.pdf (identifying three main types of flood insurance subsidies).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 4015(c)(1) (defining pre-FIRM properties by reference to
post-FIRM properties).
154. REFORMING THE NFIP, supra note 152 (identifying policy rationale of
subsidy).
155. Id. (noting number of policy holders making use of pre-FIRM subsidy).
156. Id. at 5 (observing property owners that qualify for newly mapped
subsidy).
157. See id. (describing rationale behind newly mapped subsidy).
158. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 18-19 (analyzing transition in risk rate
for newly mapped subsidy).
159. Id. at 19 (indicating amount of policy holders using subsidy).
160. Id. (observing who qualifies for grandfathered subsidy rate).
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based on a lower rate.161 As of September 2018, roughly nine percent of NFIP policy holders took advantage of these lower rates.162
IV. HOW

THE

NFIP MAY BEGIN

TO

MANAGE ITS DEBT PROBLEM

Congress enacted the NFIP to meet two clear goals: (1) to provide affordable flood insurance in flood-prone areas and (2) to reduce the cost of flood damage by mapping flood-risk areas and
funding flood-mitigation projects.163 FEMA’s administration of the
NFIP, however, has failed to meet these goals.164 Notably, FEMA
has been unable to effectively update its flood maps or enforce its
flood mitigation programs targeted at severe repetitive loss
properties.165
A. Accurate Flood Mapping
The greatest criticism that FEMA faces in administering the
NFIP is its enforcement and maintenance of FIRMs.166 Under the
NFIP, FEMA must assess the necessity to update a FIRM at least
once every five years.167 Nothing, however, obligates FEMA to substantively update these flood maps, which has caused a great disparity in the accuracy and age of these maps across the country.168
A large body of evidence suggests that many FEMA flood maps
are not up to date.169 According to a 2020 flood map study, nearly
161. See REFORMING THE NFIP, supra note 152, at 5 (describing grandfathered
subsidy rates).
162. INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 19 (reporting how many NFIP policy
holders have grandfathered premium rates).
163. Id. at 2 (outlining general purpose of NFIP); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
(listing purpose of NFIP).
164. See Walsh, supra note 16 (discussing how NFIP has many logistical issues).
165. For a further discussion of FEMA’s administrative issues, see infra notes
166-200 and accompanying text.
166. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FEMA NEEDS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT
OF ITS FLOOD MAPPING PROGRAMS 3 (2017) [hereinafter FLOOD MAPPING], https://
www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-110-Sep17.pdf (finding
deficiencies in FEMA’s handling of flood mapping responsibilities).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 4101(e) (requiring FEMA to review FIRMs at least once every
five years).
168. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 4 (discussing variability in age and
accuracy of flood maps). For a further discussion of flood maps, see supra notes
107-26 and accompanying text.
169. See Christopher Flavelle et al., New Data Reveals Hidden Flood Risk Across
America, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
06/29/climate/hidden-flood-risk-maps.html (highlighting unreported flood risk);
see also Joel Scata, FEMA’s Outdated and Backward Looking Flood Maps, NAT’L RES.
DEF. COUNCIL (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/joel-scata/femasoutdated-and-backward-looking-flood-maps (discussing FEMA’s failure to update
flood maps).
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six million more homes are considered at risk than current FEMA
maps convey.170 Moreover, FEMA is far from meeting its own flood
map goals.171 A Department of Homeland Security (DHS) investigation found that FEMA’s flood maps are only forty-two percent up
to date, falling significantly short of FEMA’s eighty percent goal.172
FIRMs and other flood maps are an integral part of administering flood insurance policies; without them, there is no accurate way
to determine which properties are at risk of flooding or to calculate
the rate for premiums.173 Recommendations to improve flood
mapping include replacing FEMA’s current oversight initiatives
with predictive flood models that account for variables such as rising sea levels.174 Additionally, depoliticizing the role of flood maps
may also increase risk-assessment accuracy.175 Currently, local
lawmakers have an incentive to challenge the adequacy of flood
maps because understating flood risk lowers insurance premiums
for constituents and eliminates potential restrictions on local
development.176
The NFIP can increase its policy base and become more costeffective by regularly enforcing and updating these flood maps.177
The NFIP aims to keep premium prices reasonable so that flood
insurance is widely available.178 As a result, the NFIP relies on a
170. See Flavelle et al., supra note 169 (evaluating 2020 flood study).
171. See FLOOD MAPPING, supra note 166 (observing FEMA’s failure to meet its
own flood map goals).
172. Id. (highlighting disparity in FEMA’s attainment).
173. See Scata, supra note 169 (analyzing importance of FEMA’s flood mapping function).
174. See id. (advocating for new flood mapping practices); see also FLOOD MAPPING, supra note 166, at 11 (endorsing FEMA oversight changes).
175. Sarah Pralle, Hurricane Harvey Shows How Floods Don’t Pay Attention to Flood
Zone Maps – or Politicians, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/07/hurricane-harveyshows-how-floods-dont-pay-attention-to-flood-zone-maps-or-politicians/ (analyzing
role local politics plays in map updating process). In New Orleans, local officials
pressured FEMA to redraw flood maps, which moved more than half of the population out of a high-risk flood zone despite most residents living at or below sea
level. Id. (highlighting inconsistent flood mapping results); see also Ryan Kailath,
New Maps Label Much of New Orleans Out of Flood Hazard Area, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Sept. 30, 2016, 4:43 PM), https://www.npr.org/2016/09/30/495794999/newmaps-label-much-of-new-orleans-out-of-flood-hazard-area (observing impacts of political pressure on flood mapping).
176. See Pralle, supra note 175 (discussing effects of politicization); see also
Flavelle et al., supra note 169 (noting impact of politics on flood map accuracy).
177. See REFORMING THE NFIP, supra note 152, at 10 (analyzing methods to
increase NFIP participation).
178. See id. at 9 (discussing policy rationale behind low premiums).
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large premium base to generate revenue.179 By timely updating
flood maps, FEMA can effectively identify more consumers that live
in flood-risk areas.180 This not only helps the program generate
revenue, but it also offers insurance to property owners who would
otherwise not be covered in the event of a flood disaster.181
B. Repetitive Loss Properties
Another major problem that the NFIP faces is paying for repetitive loss property and severe repetitive loss property claims.182
Under the NFIP, a repetitive loss property is a property subject to
flood-related damage on at least two occasions, with damages totaling at least twenty-five percent of the building’s value during each
flooding event.183 The NFIP defines severe repetitive loss properties as properties that incurred flood damage at least four times
with the amount of each claim totaling over five thousand dollars or
the cumulative claims totaling over twenty thousand dollars.184 The
NFIP also classifies a property as a severe repetitive loss property if
the property owner made at least two flood claims that exceeded
the property’s full value.185
Repetitive loss properties and severe repetitive loss properties
make up only two percent of active NFIP policies, yet they “account[ ] for approximately . . . 16% of total claims.”186 This disparity causes the NFIP to pay more in claims for repetitive loss
properties than the properties are worth.187 This untenable result
conflicts with the NFIP’s overarching goal of mitigating flood
risk.188
In a recent audit, DHS determined that FEMA has not “adequately manag[ed] [severe repetitive loss] properties covered by
179. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 23 (discussing NFIP’s main sources
of revenue).
180. See Scata, supra note 169 (noting importance of updating maps).
181. Id. (reasoning benefits of updated maps).
182. See REFORMING THE NFIP, supra note 152, at 15 (analyzing need for
reform).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 4121(a)(7)(A) (defining repetitive loss structures).
184. Id. § 4014(h) (defining severe repetitive loss properties).
185. Id. (classifying additional severe repetitive loss properties).
186. REFORMING THE NFIP, supra note 152, at 15 (analyzing extent of repetitive loss property cost).
187. See Alice C. Hill & Craig Fugate, The Same Houses Flood Every Year and We
Keep Paying for Them, HILL (July 31, 2017, 1:40 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/
pundits-blog/energy-environment/344607-the-same-houses-flood-every-year-andwe-keep-paying-for (exemplifying cost of repetitive loss property issue).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (listing purpose of NFIP).
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NFIP.”189 The report found that FEMA does not maintain accurate
data regarding severe repetitive loss properties, and its flood mitigation efforts for these properties provide “neither equitable nor
timely relief.”190 Specifically, the audit established that seventythree percent of properties listed as severe repetitive loss properties
had not completed any flood-mitigation work.191 The report recommended that FEMA revamp its community outreach program to
address the pressing needs of severe repetitive loss properties.192
Moreover, DHS recommended that FEMA increase the availability
of grants and develop a transparent plan to enforce flood-mitigation efforts.193
FEMA could further offset the cost of severe repetitive loss
properties by increasing the availability of property buyouts.194 According to FEMA data, “[T]hese properties routinely flood every
two to three years.”195 The cost of continually repairing and mitigating flood damage eventually outweighs its benefits.196 Instead of
purchasing at-risk flood homes, FEMA allocates more of its funds
toward repairs.197 Since 2000, FEMA has spent an estimated $46.6
billion on flood repairs, while only providing $804 million to
purchase flood-risk properties.198 FEMA should seize the opportunity to buy severe repetitive loss properties from willing property
owners.199 By purchasing these properties, FEMA would not only
offer property owners the chance to move out of flood risk homes,
189. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FEMA IS NOT EFFECTIVELY ADMINISTERING
PROGRAM TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE DAMAGE TO SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS PROPER(2020) [hereinafter NOT EFFECTIVELY ADMINISTERING], https://
TIES
www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2020-09/OIG-20-68-Sep20.pdf (analyzing FEMA’s management of severe repetitive loss properties).
190. Id. (discussing audit’s findings).
191. Id. at 2 (highlighting lack of flood-mitigation efforts for severe repetitive
loss properties).
192. Id. at 15 (recommending severe repetitive loss property solutions).
193. Id. (endorsing further mitigation strategies).
194. Rob Moore, Seeking Higher Ground: How to Break the Cycle of Repeated Flooding With Climate-Smart Flood Insurance Reforms, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL 1 (July 25,
2017), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/climate-smart-flood-insuranceib.pdf (analyzing effective means of reducing repetitive loss property risk).
195. Id. at 3 (discussing rate of flooding).
196. See id. (analyzing economics of continually repairing flood-prone
properties).
197. Id. at 4 (observing FEMA’s routine practice).
198. Id. (comparing fund distribution).
199. See Moore, supra note 194, at 3 (discussing need to purchase more at-risk
repetitive loss properties); see also Walsh, supra note 16 (noting need of FEMA
buyout programs).
A
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but it would also save money in the long run over claims on repetitive loss properties that it does not have to pay to repair.200
V. THE IMPACT

OF THE

NFIP

Millions of property owners rely on the NFIP for affordable
flood insurance coverage that would not exist otherwise.201 The
current program appears to be on the verge of unsustainability.202
Poor management, an increase in powerful tropical storms, and rising sea levels have left the program with over twenty billion dollars
in debt.203 Immediate changes to the NFIP will not only lower its
debts, but will continue to offer affordable flood insurance to property owners who rely on the program.204
The increasing frequency of strong hurricanes and tropical
storms due to climate change may leave the NFIP one major hurricane away from requiring another multi-billion-dollar bailout.205
Although natural disasters are beyond its control, FEMA can immediately implement various measures to make the NFIP a more comprehensive and cost-effective government program.206 By updating
flood maps to reflect flood risk more accurately in the United
States, FEMA can better inform property owners and increase the
NFIP’s policy base.207 Moreover, FEMA may address flood damage
actively through mitigation measures to reduce the overall cost of
the program in the long run.208

200. See Moore, supra note 194, at 4 (explaining benefits of buyout program).
201. See THE WATERMARK, supra note 88 (noting millions of NFIP policies in
force).
202. See Walsh, supra note 16 (describing NFIP as “broke and broken”).
203. See id. (explaining main issues facing NFIP); see also INTRODUCTION, supra
note 17, at 27 (noting impossibility of NFIP, as currently structured, to pay off its
debt in ten years).
204. For a further discussion of issues faced by the NFIP, see supra notes 163200 and accompanying text.
205. For a further discussion of the role of climate change on the NFIP’s future, see supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
206. See FLOOD MAPPING, supra note 166, at 11 (noting necessary changes to
FEMA’s flood map updating procedure); see also NOT EFFECTIVELY ADMINISTERING,
supra note 189, at 15 (advocating for changes to FEMA’s severe repetitive loss property policies).
207. See Scata, supra note 169 (demonstrating benefits of current flood maps).
For a further discussion on the benefits of up-to-date flood maps, see supra notes
166-81 and accompanying text.
208. See Moore, supra note 194, at 2 (observing benefits of proactive flood
mitigation policies).
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Flood-risk management is not an issue that will simply fade
away if ignored.209 As climate change persists, flood disasters will
affect more property owners.210 If Congress discontinued the NFIP
in favor of ad hoc disaster relief bills or a private insurance takeover, millions of property owners would lose affordable flood insurance.211 Although the NFIP may never be profitable, it certainly
serves an important function.212 The future efficacy of the NFIP
requires immediate changes to shed its outstanding debt.213
Louis Masi*
209. See Flavelle et al., supra note 169 (noting flood risks are much more widespread than currently reported).
210. See Risky Business, supra note 7, at 4 (assessing increasing threat of coastal
storm flooding); see also Lindsey, supra note 59 (discussing future projections of
rising sea levels).
211. See INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 2 (observing NFIP legislative intent
to protect property owners and reduce financial burden of disaster relief).
212. See id. at 26 (noting NFIP’s ability to cover its own costs prior to 2005).
213. See Walsh, supra note 16 (discussing importance of NFIP reform).
* J.D., 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; B.A., Marketing, 2017, Fordham University.
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